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pAbstract
The studies of initial public offering pricing had been a popular interest of academic
research recently, but there is still little study for entrepreneurial firms now. Under
the asymmetric information hypothesis and signaling theory, we try to find some
factors affecting the initial public offering pricing of entrepreneurial firms. Based on
the 153 listed firms on China's Growth Enterprise Market, we do an empirical test for
the correlation between initial public offering pricing and board of director
independency, top management team ownership, venture capital existence, and
reputation of underwriter. Finally, some research hypotheses are verified. As a result,
we find that the top management team's ownership is significantly correlated to
initial public offering pricing which means that the top management team plays a
more important role in pricing of entrepreneurial firms as an insider, compared to
board of director independency as an outsider's role. Also, we find that venture
capital backing is significantly correlated to initial public offering pricing while
underwriter reputation is not, which means that venture capital plays a more
important role in pricing of entrepreneurial firms as an insider after it invested,
compared to underwriter as an outsider.
Keywords: Entrepreneurial firm; Corporate governance; Initial public offering;
Valuation; China; Growth Enterprise MarketBackground
Valuation in initial public offerings (IPO) of firms has always received much academic
attention. Scholars generally employ theories such as signaling theory under the asym-
metric information to explain it. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) suggest that the inad-
equate or unauthentic disclosure of information in an imperfect market and the
different capabilities to acquire, perceive, and understand information of market partic-
ipants will affect their decision making and the risk premium by holding different
quantity and quality of information. Only information of price is offered in the stock
market, and other information about a listed firm is highly asymmetric. Information
asymmetry exists between regulatory authorities and listed companies, between listed
companies and investors, as well as between institutional investors and individual in-
vestors. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) point out that information is the foundation of
financial market operations, and hence, such information asymmetry would cause
many problems for the market. For instance, due to prior information asymmetry,
products with bad quality will drive out those with good quality because of adverse2014 Xu and Xie; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
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traded in the market.
Allen and Faulhaber (1989) show that it is difficult for investors to effectively differ-
entiate good from bad, when the performances of firms vary in the market. But the
firms with good performances certainly wish to distinguish themselves from those with
bad performances, and they generally can signal to the investors by making use of the
IPO pricing. Although having a lower initial issue price, a firm can make up for its
losses in IPO during the second public offerings with a higher issue price, a higher po-
tential growth, and promising future prospects to investors. On the other hand, firms
with bad performances are unwilling to do so because they do not have beautiful fu-
tures and the losses from low IPO prices may not be compensated by the next public
offering of shares.
From the view of signal theory, investors can improve their weak position in informa-
tion asymmetry by acquiring signals. Deeds et al. (1997) say that ‘certain variables or
indicators send signals to potential investors about the capabilities and thus future
value of firms’. Some scholars (Daily et al. 2003) believe that insiders are more in-
formed about the IPO firm's potential than outsiders. Specifically, the managers with
high-quality information of firms will signal to potential investors through their capital
structures or dividend policies (Ross 1977). With a lack of clear signals to evaluate the
existing values or when such signals are unobservable, the organizational and govern-
ance symbol can be used as an effective way to reduce uncertainty in IPO.
Many researchers made a lot of empirical tests on signal in IPO valuation from differ-
ent angles, but something is still in an equivocal way. Specially, there is still little study
for entrepreneurial firms in China. As the characteristics, the insiders occupied a domin-
ant position of the entrepreneurial firm's ownership in China, while there are nominated
independent directors as decorations forced by regulation when the entrepreneurial firms
go to IPO. Therefore, we tend to study the impact of insiders and outsiders on IPO
valuation for entrepreneurial firms listed in China's Growth Enterprise Market and
try to find something specially.
Literature review and hypotheses
In considering corporate governance, we generally focus on inside directors and outside
directors, and board compositions are thought as the proportion of outside and inside
directors on the board. Specially, the existence of an outside director is regarded as a
signal of the director's independency. Some researches argue that outside directors are
effective in resolving agency problems (Johnson et al. 1996) because outsiders have
incentive to signal their managerial competence to employers and their expertise in
monitoring management. However, empirical evidence on the relationship between outside
directors and firm performance is in an equivocal way. Schellenger et al. (1989) find that
bigger percentages of outside directors are associated with increased financial performance,
while others suggest that outside directors are ineffective in monitoring management.
Arthurs et al. (2008) believe that internal supervision and experiences from the board
of directors reduce IPO underpricing due to a higher valuation in IPO.
Baysinger and Butler (1985) show, based on a sample of 266 firms between 1970 and
1980, that the firms with a higher proportion of independent directors have a better
performance. Chahine and Filatotchev (2008) suggest that, according to agency theory,
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value with strategic advices and external knowledge and resources. With high costs of
takeover, non-managing shareholders prefer strict monitoring of the management team
by independent directors. The existence of independent directors also represents sound
governance structure and offers outside investors with additional information that en-
sures better IPO performances. A more important finding of Leone et al. (2007) is that
if the incumbent independent directors restrict the opportunism of the management
and reduce the potential strategic mistakes, they also are able to limit unnecessary
information disclosure, because excessive and unnecessary information disclosure
will reduce competitiveness of the firm. Therefore, independent directors will raise
IPO valuation. We offer the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The IPO valuation of entrepreneurial firms by means of the issue pre-
mium in IPO will be positively associated with the board independency measured by
the percentage of independent director number; the higher the board independency
measured by the percentage of independent director number is, the higher the valuation
of an entrepreneurial firm by means of the issue premium in IPO is.
Kroll et al. (2007) suggest that the initial top management team (TMT) members
have accompanied the firms for many years and possess tacit knowledge and common
visions. The establishment of such common visions requires long time of fostering and
continuous interaction. TMTs with common goals usually are more flexible, respond
more quickly to changes, and handle problems better. They also believes that the initial
TMTs are the primal providers of key human resources for IPO firms, and such human
resources exist in the tacit knowledge and personal investment of TMT members in
the growth processes of firms. The acquisition of tacit knowledge is also relatively diffi-
cult because it is established on the mutually trusting interpersonal relationship, while
common visions are formed gradually in long-term work. The ownership status of
TMT is observable by outside investors because firms are obliged to disclose the own-
ership status and compensatory arrangements of their TMTs. Beatty and Zajac (1994)
point out that ownership arrangement enables the management team to diversify the
risk of firm failure. Investors may regard such risk diversification as signals of manage-
ment devotion and corporate quality and performance.
Jain and Kini (1994) believe that the performances of IPO firms are often unsatisfactory
due to the agency problem. This echoes the opinion of Jensen and Meckling (1976) that
managers of IPO firms may misuse their new positions as agents because they reap enor-
mous monetary and non-monetary benefits by selling the shares they hold and having no
exit costs to face. Therefore, if the TMT holds a larger proportion of the firm's shares, the
agency problem will be less severe. Researches also show that the higher the proportion of
firm shares held by its TMT, the more capable to signal to outside investors positively
(Barney et al. 1996; Filatotchev and Bishop 2002; Florin et al. 2003).
Florin and Simsek (2007) suggest that managerial personnel are more inclined to
underpricing when they can reap more benefits from IPO than their original benefits.
Zimmerman (2008) thinks that TMT heterogeneity provides a signal to potential in-
vestors about the quality of IPO which is associated with greater capital accumula-
tions in the future. Other researches find that the higher the proportion of firm
shares held by its TMT, the more possibility to affect the issue price of IPO positively
(Carter and Auken 1990; Certo 2003).
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real value of an IPO firm than the outside investors. According to signaling theory, the
shareholding of TMT delivers a message about the firm value. If TMT members sell
stocks they hold largely, it means that the firm is overvalued. Hence, we offer the fol-
lowing hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The IPO valuation of entrepreneurial firms by means of the issue pre-
mium in IPO will be positively associated with the TMT ownership; the higher the
TMT ownership is, the higher the valuation of an entrepreneurial firm by means of the
issue premium in IPO is.
Amit et al. (1990) point out theoretically that adverse selection exists when venture
capitals search for investment opportunities in start-up firms. Those entrepreneurs with
low capabilities are willing to share their risks with outside organizations, while entre-
preneurs with high capabilities like to manage firms by themselves instead of allying
partners. Some young and grandstanding venture capitalists attempt to accelerate IPO
of firms which they invest in by using false signals of reputation and performance.
Grandstanding effect suggests that young venture capital institutes are likely to push for
premature IPO of firms in which they invest in order to reap reputation as soon as possible.
Such inappropriate timing of IPO will inevitably result in higher underpricing in IPO.
Megginson and Weiss (1991) indicate that venture capital backing results in significantly
lower initial returns and gross spreads, which support the certification role of venture
capitalists in initial public offerings. Wong and Wong (2008) notice that although a num-
ber of studies show that the venture capitals (VCs) can ease underpricing issues and can
help ventures generate better post-IPO operational performance in the US market, they
find that the effects of VC participations in Hong Kong are different. They present that
the underpricing issues of VC-backed IPOs are more severe than non-VC-backed IPOs,
which means that firms with VC backing have higher underpricing in IPO, which means
lower IPO valuation, than those without VC backing. In sum, considering the back-
grounds of our research, we offer the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The IPO valuation of entrepreneurial firms by means of the issue pre-
mium in IPO will be negatively associated with the venture capital backing measured
by venture capitals existing or not; the higher the venture capital backing measured by
venture capitals existing or not is, the higher the valuation of an entrepreneurial firm
by means of the issue premium in IPO is.
Underwriters play a very important role in IPO, like coordinating the allocation of in-
terests among various stakeholders. Firms prefer to choose a stronger underwriter to
show a positive signal to the outsiders in order to raise more money. However, the lar-
ger or stronger an underwriter is, the greater its bargaining power becomes. Because
the main revenue of underwriters comes from their underwriting fees, management
fees, sales allowances, and transaction commission of stock listing, given the fixed issu-
ing costs, underwriters will attempt to convince the IPO firms to lower their issue
prices so as to reduce risks; whether new stock issue may be successful is dependent on
the market conditions.
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) suggest that underwriters have sufficient power to mo-
tivate institutional investors to disclose the authentic information they use to evaluate
the values of the new IPO firms or reward them for behaving as good customers.
Michaely and Shaw (1994) prove that the higher underwriter reputation will lower IPO
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derwriters' reward for institutional investors to undertake the risks of adverse selection
or behave as good customers.
From the view of institutional investors, the stable relationships with reputable un-
derwriters are of higher values. It is reasonable to assume that underwriters with higher
reputation will be more capable of rewarding their institutional investors and therefore
able to offer their clients higher IPO premiums (Bradley and Jordan 2002).
Hypothesis 4: The IPO valuation of entrepreneurial firms by means of the issue pre-
mium in IPO will be negatively associated with the underwriter reputation measured
by the market share of each underwriter; the higher the underwriter reputation measured
by the market share of each underwriter is, the higher the valuation of an entrepreneurial
firm by means of the issue premium in IPO is.
Methods
Samples and data
The sample to be studied comes from 153 firms listed on the Chinese Growth Firm
Market, launched on October 30, 2009 to December 31, 2010, with stock code from
300001 to 300154; only the firm with stock code 300060 is removed because it failed to
launch IPO successfully for some reasons. Data of the sample in this paper mainly
come from the prospectus of IPO firms, Wind Database and Bloomberg Limited
Partnership.
Dependent variables
IPO valuation. It is regarded as the valuation in initial public offering of a firm, which
is also known as the issue premium in IPO and equal to the relative difference between
the offer price per share and net asset per share. The variables of IPO valuation can be
calculated as follows:
IPO valuation ¼ Issue price per share–Net asset per shareð Þ=Issue price per share
The data is extracted from and computed based on information in the Wind Database.Independent variable
Board independency. Generally, most researches consider board members to be inde-
pendent if they have neither financial nor family ties with the CEO and the firm
(Hwang and Kim 2009). The board independency variable is measured as the percentage
of the number of independent directors to the total number of directors on the board.
Data is from the prospectus of the IPO firms.
TMT ownership. The TMT ownership variable is measured as the percentage of
the equity owned by TMT to total equity of the firm. Data is from the prospectus of
the IPO firms.
Venture capital backing. Venture capital backing has been argued and been shown to
influence the ability of the firm to raise capital at IPO (Gulati and Higgins 2003). It is
denoted as dummy variable: ‘1’ for firms with VC backing and ‘0’ for those without.
Data is from the prospectus of the IPO firms.
Underwriter reputation. The reputation of the underwriter has been shown to be
beneficial to IPO performance (Zimmerman 2008). The underwriter reputation is measured
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Chinese capital markets released by Bloomberg Limited Partnership. The top 10%
underwriters will score 10, and the score is reduced by 1 for every subsequent 10%.
Underwriters not listed in the ranking score 0.
Control variables
There are some elementary factors influencing the IPO valuation of firms other than
those discussed above. Therefore, some variables need to be studied as the control variables
here. Such control variables include the following:
Firm age. Firm age, the time since founding, helped to control for organizations' maturity.
Those that are older and larger suffer less from a ‘liability of newness’ (Singh et al. 1986).
It is measured as the number of years from the setup of a firm to its IPO. Data is from the
prospectus of the IPO firms.
TMT size. Team size is a frequently used control variable especially in management
team-related research (Sanders and Carpenter 1998). It is measured as the number of
TMT members. Data is from the prospectus of the IPO firms.
Founder control. The founder plays an important role in a new firm. The personal percep-
tions of the firm's founder influence the firm's strategy and operations (Baron et al. 1999).
The founder-CEO's involvement in the growth and success of a firm since its inception may
motivate the CEO to derive the benefits of an IPO (Fischer and Pollock 2004).
Founder control is denoted as a dummy variable. If the founder of IPO firm owns
more than 50% of its stocks, the firm is deemed as under the founder's control and marked
as ‘1’. Otherwise, the firm is marked as ‘0’. Data is from the prospectus of the IPO firms.
Board chairman control. The relationship between CEO/chair duality and firm per-
formance has not shown consistent results (Daily and Dalton 1993). It is denoted as a
dummy variable. If the board chairman of an IPO firm is also its general manager, the
firm is deemed as under its board chairman's control and marked as ‘1’. Otherwise, the
firm is marked as ‘0’. Data is from the prospectus of the IPO firms.
P/E ratio at issuing. Price-earnings ratio at issuing is the ratio of the issue price per
share of an IPO firm to its earnings per share last accounting period when it is issuing,
which can measure the value to invest in the issue bidding. The variable is obtained
from Wind Database.
IPO size. In studies of IPO, total size of issuance is often considered. A larger IPO is
generally issued by long-established enterprises, which will reduce the perceived risk of
issuance (Dunbar 2000). Beatty and Ritter (1986) called this phenomenon as ‘empirical
regularity’. Compared to the large established enterprises, the issuance of smaller
firms generally faces the larger corresponding uncertainty. It is measured as the mul-
tiple of issue price and the number of issued shares in IPO. The data is obtained from
Wind Database.
Statistical analyses
Firstly, the SPSS statistical analysis software is used to conduct descriptive statistical
analyses on all independent variables and control variables and test for correlation
among various influencing factors. Then, we examine the hypotheses by ordinary least
squares hierarchical regression models and use IPO valuation as a dependent variable;
board independency, TMT ownership, venture capital backing, and underwriter
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board chairman control, P/E ratio at issuing, and IPO size as the control variables.
The model is as follows:
IPO valuationi ¼ αoi þ α1iBoard independency þ α2iTMT ownership
þα3iVenture capital backingþ α4iUnderwriter reputationþ α5iFirm age
þα6iTMT sizeþ α7iFounder control þ α8iBoard chairman control
þα9i P=E ratio at issuingþ α10iIPO sizeþ ε
Results
Descriptive statistical analysis
Table 1 illustrates the results of descriptive statistical analysis of the dependent variable,
independent variables, and control variables.
In the control variables, with regard to the firm age, the ages of the IPO firms on
China's Growth Enterprise Market vary from a minimum of 4 years to a maximum of
24 years, and the average is approximately 10 years. It seems so much different with
each other because China's Growth Enterprise Market was just launched and the China
Securities Regulatory Commission remains cautious about the entrepreneurial firms
listed on it. The TMT size varies from a minimum of 3 to a maximum of 9, the mean
close to 6, with a relatively small standard deviation. The reason may be that the entre-
preneurial firms need to establish a modern corporate governance system to gain mar-
ket recognition before going public, so most of firms established a similar managerial
structure of management teams. The average value for the variable ‘founder control’ is
0.86, indicating that most of entrepreneurial firms are controlled by their founders.
This is consistent with the nature of entrepreneurial firms. The mean of the variable
‘board chairman control’ is 0.52, indicating that there is approximately half of entrepre-
neurial firms wherein the board chairman and general manager are the same person.
For the private and entrepreneurial firms, this may be attributed to the establishment
of modern corporate governance.
Among the independent variables, with regard to the board independency, due to
regulatory requirements, the proportion of independent directors must exceed one
third in the board of directors, so the average number of the variable ‘independentTable 1 Descriptive statistics
Number Minimum Maximum Mean S.D.
IPO valuation 153 0.8 0.97 0.91 0.03
Firm age 153 4 24 9.85 3.33
TMT size 153 3 9 5.72 1.43
Founder control 153 0 1 0.86 0.35
Board chairman control 153 0 1 0.52 0.50
P/E ratio at issuing 153 36.98 138.46 68.60 19.70
IPO size 153 9,000 2.70E+05 75,633.00 43,168.47
Board independency 153 0.33 0.67 0.36 0.05
TMT ownership 153 0 0.96 0.42 0.27
VC backing 153 0 1 0.64 0.48
Underwriter reputation 153 0 10 6.92 3.14
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difference in the board independency of IPO firms on China's Growth Enterprise Market.
The ratio of TMT ownership varies from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 0.96 with
a mean of 0.42 and standard deviation of 0.27. This indicates significant differences in
terms of this variable among IPO firms on the China's Growth Enterprise Market. The
average of the variable ‘venture capital backing’ is 0.64, meaning that 64% of the firms
have VC backing. However, in-depth research reveals that many venture capitals in the
entrepreneurial firms joined them just before their IPO. The mean of the variable
‘underwriter reputation’ is 6.92, which shows that underwriters with higher rankings
will gain more recognition from issuers. The average of the variable ‘first day turnover
rate’ is 75.18%, showing extremely frequent and active trading of the stocks of the IPO
firms on the first day of listing. The average of the variable ‘allotment ratio of subscription’
is 0.77% which is very low. It is clear that the supply and demand of the new stocks of-
fered are highly unbalanced. The mean of the variable ‘market heat’ is −3.219E4, and
its standard deviation is 89,094.63, indicating significant differences in the market heat
of IPO firms in different industries. The compound profit variable varies from a mini-
mum of −1.46 to a maximum of 6.15 with a mean of 0.0034, indicating that the prior
performance of different firms varies significantly.
Hypothesis testing
The correlation between IPO valuation and its four independent variables, as well as
the control variables, is illustrated in Table 2. Mostly, correlations among various inde-
pendent variables and control variables are insignificant or significant but with a small
coefficient. Only the correlation coefficient between board chairman control and TMT
ownership is significant with a relatively bigger coefficient of 0.59, more than 0.5. In
accordance with the rules, it should have been considered that one of the variables is
alternated by another variable. Considering that one is the independent variable and
another one is the control variable and that they do not have interactive influence, we
still retain both for further detailed study. However, it is reasonable because the board
chairman of a firm normally owns a large proportion of shares. When the board chair-
man and the general manager of a firm are the same person, the proportion of shares
held by the TMT will increase significantly as a result. Excluding it, there are no obvi-
ous correlations among the various independent variables and control variables, or the
correlation coefficients are less than 0.5.
IPO valuation is significantly correlated to firm age, P/E ratio at issuing, IPO size,
TMT ownership, and venture capital backing.
As illustrated in Table 3, IPO valuation is used as a dependent variable, while firm age,
TMT size, founder control, board chairman control, P/E ratio at issuing, and IPO size are
used as control variables, and board independency, TMT ownership, VC backing, and
underwriter reputation are used as independent variables to test hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4.
In model 1, only control variables are inputted, and the result of analysis shows that firm
age and IPO size, especially P/E ratio at issuing, are significantly correlated to IPO valuation.
However, the significant correlation between IPO valuation and P/E ratio at issuing can be
explained by the fact that the calculations of both variables involve the issue price.
In model 2, the board independency is inputted, and the result indicates that this vari-
able has no significant correlation with IPO valuation, so hypothesis 1 is not verified.
Table 2 Correlation matrix of IPO valuation with its independent variables and control
variables
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 IPO valuation 1
2 Firm age −0.225** 1
3 TMT size −0.037 0.007 1
4 Founder control 0.064 0.017 0.015 1
5 Board chairman
control
0.078 0.161* 0.234** 0.265** 1
6 P/E ratio at issuing 0.572** −0.149 0.081 0.063 0.127
7 IPO size 0.237** 0.043 0.088 −0.053 −0.024 0.229** 1
8 Board
independence
−0.03 0.08 −0.08 0.129 −0.111 −0.093 −0.033 1
9 TMT ownership 0.201* 0.037 0.11 0.341** 0.590** 0.082 −0.031 0.066 1
10 VC backing −0.304** −0.033 0.103 0.056 0.218** −0.057 −0.092 −0.125 0.106 1
11 Underwriter
reputation
0.071 −0.121 0.178* −0.016 0.014 0.193* 0.184* 0.057 −0.056 0.203* 1
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
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existing in IPO firms on China's Growth Enterprise Market. The board independency
is also restricted to laws and regulations; therefore, the lack of explanatory function can
be explained.
In model 3, the variable of TMT ownership is added. This variable is significantly
correlated to IPO valuation; the regression coefficient is 0.223 with p < 0.05. Hypothesis
2 is verified.
In model 4, the variable of venture capital backing is added, and the regression coefficient
is −0.278 with p < 0.001. Hypothesis 3 is verified, and the explanatory function of the
regression model is enhanced.
In model 5, the underwriter reputation variable is added, and there is no significant
correlation with IPO valuation. Hypothesis 4 is not verified. Recall our reviews in
the literature; many studies of the underwriter reputation's effect on IPO valuationTable 3 Regression examination with IPO valuation as dependent variable
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Firm age −0.160* −0.163* −0.148* −0.173** −0.172**
TMT size −0.107 −0.106 −0.103 −0.083 −0.084
Founder control 0.009 0.004 −0.034 −0.029 −0.029
Board chairman control 0.047 0.052 −0.075 −0.003 −0.002
P/E ratio at issuing 0.520*** 0.523*** 0.524*** 0.501*** 0.500***
IPO size 0.126+ 0.126+ 0.127+ 0.103 0.102
Board independence 0.036 0.011 −0.015 −0.016
TMT ownership 0.223** 0.219** 0.220**
VC backing −0.278*** −0.280***
Underwriter reputation 0.007
F 13.834 11.836 11.685 13.784 12.318
R2 0.367 0.337 0.399 0.472 0.472
+Significant at p < 0.1; *Significant at p < 0.05; **Significant at p < 0.01; ***Significant at p < 0.001.
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slightly beyond expectation.Conclusions
Models 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 examine the relationships between IPO valuation and board
independency, TMT ownership, venture capital backing, and underwriter reputation.
The results indicate that the regression coefficients between IPO valuation and board
independency or underwriter reputation are insignificant, while the regression relation-
ships between IPO valuation and TMT ownership, and venture capital backing are sig-
nificant, where the signs of relationships are consistent with the hypotheses. This partly
verifies the explanation by signaling theory under the hypothesis of asymmetric informa-
tion for IPO valuation. However, we find it is special in China that the insiders occupied a
dominant position of the entrepreneurial firm's ownership as Chinese characteristics,
while there are nominated independent directors (outsiders) as decorations forced by
regulation when the entrepreneurial firms go to IPO. If we regard the entrepreneurial
firms from insider and outsider views, we find that the top management team plays a
more important role in pricing of entrepreneurial firms as an insider, compared to board
of director independency as an outsider's role, because the top management team's
ownership is significantly correlated to initial public offering pricing while board of
director independency is not. We also find that venture capital plays a more important
role in pricing of entrepreneurial firms as an insider after it invested, compared to
underwriter as an outsider, because venture capital backing is significantly correlated
to initial public offering pricing while underwriter reputation is not. As mentioned
earlier, the board independency, restricted by the special requirement in Chinese stock
markets, is just a decoration. Also, the influence of underwriter reputation on IPO
valuation still remains controversial.Discussions
The results of this research show that the explanations of signaling theory under the
hypothesis of asymmetric information to IPO valuation are partially verified. From the
perspective of firms to be IPO, TMT's ownership of equity will signal to the investors
about the good quality of a firm and the IPO firms should make use of such an influ-
ence mechanism. However, the venture capital, having an outstanding contribution in
the development of entrepreneurial firms, negatively influences the issue price in IPO
process. The firms, which hope to raise more money in IPO, should carefully weigh the
pros and cons when choosing venture capitals.Limitation
The first limitation is the newness of China's Growth Enterprise Market, only 153
firms in our sample of this paper. Specially, the firms which launched IPOs in 2009,
due to the long preparation time of enormous market attention, have experienced high
underpricing levels. This may result in biases in the results. Secondly, R2 are still small
in the above models which are less than 0.5, so our models by only using asymmetric
information theory are not sufficient to explain the reality of IPO valuation. A few the-
ories still cannot fully explain such a complex economic phenomenon.
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This research is focused on the IPO valuation of entrepreneurial firms in China's
Growth Enterprise Market. These firms have their special characteristics that say they
may be different from IPO firms in the Growth Enterprise Market of other countries.
So in the future, scholars may give attention to the international comparison between
IPO in China's Growth Enterprise Market and the ones in the Growth Enterprise Mar-
ket of other countries. On the other hand, due to market overheating on China's
Growth Enterprise Market, investors give a high valuation to firms that IPO on the
Market, which results in an excessive amount of money got by the IPO firms, and even
far more than the firms needed. The IPO firms face the challenges in asset manage-
ment. So, in the future, we can study the impact of over-raised funds on the growth
and innovation of entrepreneurial firms, as well as the international difference.
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